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ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPEAL BOARD FAILED TO ANALYZE PROPORTIONALITY AND 
INCONSISTENCY AND TO ISSUE APPROPRIATE FINDINGS. 
The City contends (a) Rosen failed to put on prima facie evidence of inconsistent 
discipline and, therefore, that the Appeal Board was not required to conduct a proportionality 
analysis; and (b) in the alternative, that the Appeal Board's conclusion that "the discipline 
was warranted" was an adequate proportionality analysis. Both arguments should be 
rejected. 
A. The Appeal Board failed to issue findings on proportionality; that failure 
was arbitrary and capricious and mandates reversal. 
The City contends Rosen's burden was to prove that other officers, in factually 
identical circumstances, were disciplined differently. Because Rosen failed to do so, the City 
asserts, the Appeal Board was not required to perform a proportionality analysis. The City's 
argument is incorrect because even assuming arguendo Rosen did not put on a prima facie 
case of inconsistency, the Appeal Board was still required to analyze and issue findings on 
proportionality, which is separate and distinct from consistency. 
City appeal boards are charged with making two inquiries: (1) whether the facts are 
supported by the evidence; and (2) whether the charges warrant the discipline imposed. 
Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Com % 949 P.2d 746,758 (Utah App. 1997). The second 
inquiry, sometimes referred to as the proportionality prong, can be broken down into two 
subparts: "First, is the sanction proportional; and second, is the sanction consistent with 
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previous sanctions imposed by the department pursuant to its own policies. Kelly v. Salt 
Lake City Civil Service Com % 2000 UT App 235, U 21, 8 P.3d 1048; see also Boston v. Salt 
Lake City Civil Service Com'n, 2009 WL 2568690 at *2 (Utah App. 2009) (unreported) 
(citing Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Serv. Com % 2007 UT App 336, 171 P.3d 474)). With 
proportionality, a police chief may abuse his discretion "if the punishment exceeds the range 
of sanctions permitted by statute or regulation, or if, in light of all the circumstances, the 
punishment is disproportionate to the offense." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 761. In other words, a 
proper proportionality analysis determines whether the punishment fits the crime, 
independent of how others may have been disciplined. Regarding consistency, the 
appropriate analysis is whether the discipline is "consistent with previous sanctions imposed 
by the [Department pursuant to its own policies." Guenon v. Midvale City, 2010 UT App 
51, K 14,230 P.3d 1032 (citing Kelly, 2000 UT App 235 at <h 21). While both are critical to 
determining whether "the charges warrant the discipline imposed," the proportionality and 
consistency analyses are very distinct. Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758. 
The only way a city appeal board can properly analyze proportionality and consistency 
is by propounding findings of fact and conclusions of law. Furthermore, those findings and 
conclusions must be sufficiently detailed so as to allow an appellant the opportunity for 
meaningful appellate review: 
2 
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This court has emphasized that an administrative agency must make 
findings of fact that are sufficiently detailed so as to permit meaningful 
appellate review. For us to meaningfully review the Board's findings, 
the findings must be 'sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion 
on each factual issue was reached.' The failure of an agency to make 
adequate findings of fact in material issues renders its findings 
'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence is 'clear, uncontroverted 
and capable of only one conclusion. 
Lucas, 949 P.2d at 755 n.5. Thus an appeal board must, at a minimum, analyze the evidence 
and explain why the discipline is proportional and/or consistent or not.1 
Again, the City argues Rosen failed to show inconsistency of discipline and, therefore, 
that the Appeal Board was not required to perform a consistency analysis. Rosen asserts that 
he did put on a prima facie case of inconsistency (discussed below). However, taking the 
City's argument at face value, the Appeal Board was still required to analyze and issue 
findings of fact on proportionality, or whether demotion was proportionate discipline for 
1
 For example, in Boston the civil service commission based its conclusion that 
termination was appropriate at least in part on the following specific factual findings: 
10. Boston received three disciplinary actions over a relatively short period of 
time. 
11. By the time the two incidents occurred which precipitated Boston's 
termination, she had been properly warned and was on notice that any further 
misconduct on her part may result in termination. 
12. The series of violations were similar in nature and progressive discipline 
had been ineffective. 
Boston, at *2. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rosen's alleged actions. It did not. That failure impedes Rosen's ability to obtain 
meaningful appellate review. Indeed, neither Rosen nor this Court is in a position to 
speculate how the Appeal Board would have analyzed proportionality or whether such 
analysis would have been sound or faulty. 
"The failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact in material issues renders 
its findings arbitrary and capricious unless the evidence is clear, uncontroverted and capable 
of only one conclusion." Id. At the hearing, the parties disputed the proportionality of 
Rosen's demotion. Thus, the evidence was not "clear, uncontroverted and capable of only 
one conclusion," and the Appeal Board's failure to issue findings was arbitrary and 
capricious and mandates a reversal. 
B. Rosen put on a prima facie case of inconsistency; therefore, the Appeal 
Board was required to analyze and issue findings on consistency. 
It is true Rosen carried the initial "burden of showing some meaningful disparity of 
treatment between [himself] and other similarly situated employees." Kelly, 2000 UT App 
235 at Tf 30. However, Rosen's burden was not to prove disparate treatment in factually 
identical situations but, rather, disparate treatment in factually similar situations. There is 
a big difference. 
No two incidents giving rise to discipline are ever identical. Every incident is 
factually unique in some way. Under the City's narrow interpretation of Kelly, no officer 
could ever prove inconsistent application of discipline. Such a strict interpretation is not 
4 
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consistent with Utah law. This Court has stated the appropriate analysis for consistency is 
whether the discipline is "consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the [Department 
pursuant to its own policies." Guenon, 2010 UT App 51 at ^ [14 (citing Kelly, 2000 UT App 
235 at f 21). Moreover, "[m]eaningful disparate treatment can only be found when similar 
factual circumstances led to a different result without explanation." Kelly, 2000 UT App 235 
at j^ 31. Thus, to put on a prima facie case of inconsistent discipline, Rosen needed only to 
show that other officers who engaged in similar conduct were treated differently. Rosen 
accomplished this. 
Rosen showed that the vast majority of all discipline meted out by the City consisted 
of verbal reprimands and written reprimands. The City had never demoted an officer prior 
to Rosen. R. 59:255:25-256:2. Rather, it was the City's practice to issue verbal and written 
reprimands, as opposed to demotion or termination, regardless of what the underlying 
allegations were. At the hearing, Rosen introduced evidence of three officers who had failed 
to appear at court hearings or trials to which they had been subpoenaed. R. 42-43. Such 
actions are akin to insubordination, which the City defines as the failure "to follow a lawful 
order". R. 34. However, all three officers received verbal reprimands. R. 42-43. Rosen was 
charged with insubordination, but was demoted. This evidence raises at least a prima facie 
case of inconsistency. 
"The failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact in material issues renders 
its findings arbitrary and capricious unless the evidence is clear, uncontroverted and capable 
5 
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of only one conclusion." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 755 n.5. Because Rosen submitted evidence 
that put the consistency of his discipline into question, the Appeal Board should have issued 
findings of fact on the issue of consistency. Its failure to do so was arbitrary and capricious 
and mandates a reversal. 
C. The Appeal Board's conclusory statement that Rosen's discipline was 
"warranted and supported by the evidence" is not a proportionality 
analysis. 
The City asserts that if the Appeal Board was required to conduct a proportionality 
analysis, it did so by stating in its decision that Rosen's demotion was "reasonable under the 
circumstances, and the discipline was warranted and supported by the evidence." R. 58. 
That argument should be rejected because the Appeal Board's brief sentence is conclusory. 
It certainly is not an analysis "sufficiently detailed and including] enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 
Lucas, 949 P.2d at 755 n.5. It provides no meaningful information for Rosen to challenge 
on appeal, which is the very reason articulated in Lucas for requiring appeal boards to issue* 
findings in the first place. Thus, the brief sentence is not a proper proportionality analysis. 
II. THE APPEAL BOARD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING ROSEN'S 
MOTION FOR ADVERSE INFERENCE. 
Rosen was disciplined in part because he allegedly violated Sgt. Cole's order of 
January 19, 2011. Because the City failed to produce the audio recording of the order upon 
request by Rosen, Rosen asked the Appeal Board to infer that Rosen's account of the January 
6 
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19 interview was correct. The Appeal Board denied the motion, stating it did not believe the 
City had intentionally destroyed the evidence. 
The City argues that the adverse inference sought by Rosen is a permissive remedy 
subject to the discretion of the Appeal Board. While Rosen generally agrees, he respectfully 
submits that the Appeal Board does not have unfettered discretion. The Appeal Board's 
discretion to grant or deny the motion should be reviewed by this Court for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Gallup, 2011 UT App 422, \ 12, 267 P.3d 289 (holding that lower 
courts are granted broad discretion on evidentiary issues and such rulings may overturned 
only for abuse of discretion, which may be demonstrated by showing a reliance on an 
erroneous conclusion of law or that there was no evidentiary basis for the ruling.) 
The City also asserts that, since the audio recording was not in the City's exclusive 
control, the City should not be punished for failing to produce it. However, the City was in 
fact in exclusive control of the recording, as there is no evidence that anyone other than City 
employees, including Rosen, had access to it. The City is responsible for maintaining and 
protecting its records and instructing its employees accordingly. The fact that the City's own 
employees had access to the recording should not relieve the City from the obligation to 
preserve it. 
III. THE APPEAL BOARD'S RECEIPT OF EXHIBITS IN ADVANCE OF THE 
HEARING WAS PRESERVED AND CAUSED ROSEN PREJUDICE. 
Rosen contends the Appeal Board's advance review of the City's proposed exhibits, 
7 
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much of which was objected to and never introduced, tainted the hearing and caused 
irreversible prejudice to Rosen. In response, the City argues Rosen failed to preserve this 
argument for appeal purposes because he did not "specifically raise this argument to the 
Board and did not introduce any supporting evidence or relevant legal authority to support 
his claim." Resp. Brief at 39. The City also argues the error, if any, was harmless. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 is the sole statutory authority governing municipal 
appeal boards. It provides that "[t]he method and manner of choosing the members of the 
appeal board, the number of members, the designation of their terms of office, and the 
procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the 
governing body of each municipality by ordinance." That is the extent of the Appeal Board's 
authority. Notably, § 10-3-1106 does not grant an appeal board authority to hear, consider, 
or rule on motions, including what in this case would essentially be a motion to recuse and/or 
a motion for a new hearing. 
Although the City fails to suggest what remedy Rosen could have sought from the 
Appeal Board, the only conceivable remedy would have been to move for the recusal of all 
the Appeal Board members and the appointment of new members. However, as noted above, 
the Appeal Board did not have authority to consider such a request. Additionally, the Appeal 
Board members could not have chosen their replacements, as appeal board members are 
selected by the "governing body of each municipality," usually pursuant to a city ordinance. 
Thus, even if Rosen had moved for a recusal, the motion would have been futile. 
8 
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Furthermore, the questionable, prejudicial comments2 made by the Appeal Board 
members occurred during closed door deliberations after the parties had been excluded. R. 
59: 18:10-19. Rosen only became aware of those comments and the extent of the prejudice 
after reviewing the transcript following appeal to this Court. 
The City's argument that the error was harmless is without merit. A brief review of 
the Appeal Board members' comments strongly indicates they had been swayed by the City's 
evidence long before the hearing had started. One board member stated: "I'm trying not to 
let the whole pants thing bother me and influence me. But I've got one hand, and my pants 
aren't falling down all the time."3 R. 59: 20:22-25. This comment was made even though 
certain proposed exhibits - which the City intended to introduce for the purpose of proving 
Rosen had intentionally dropped his pants on a second occasion - were ultimately excluded 
upon objection by Rosen. R. 59: 37:5-14. 
Another board member commented on Rosen's guilt at the very outset of the hearing, 
stating: "It seems to me that we are talking about insubordination, and he was insubordinate 
in my opinion - or allegedly."* R. 59: 24:9-11. Because no evidence had been introduced 
at that point, the board member could only have formulated his opinion of guilt from his 
2
 Identified in more detail in Rosen's opening brief. Brief Petr., at p. 20-21. 
3
 This comment was made during closed-door deliberations to which Rosen and his 
counsel were not privy. 
4
 This comment was also made while the parties were excluded from the proceeding. 
9 
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i 
review of the City's materials. These comments alone show the Appeal Board's review of 
the City's proposed exhibits in advance was not harmless and in fact prejudiced Rosen's right 
to a fair hearing by impartial board members. 
The City's submission of proposed exhibits to the Appeal Board weeks prior to the < 
hearing violated Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 and prejudiced Rosen. For these reasons, the 
Appeal Board's decision should be reversed or, in the alternative, the decision should be 
reversed and remanded for a new hearing before impartial board members. 
IV. THE APPEAL BOARD'S ERRONEOUS FINDINGS WERE HARMFUL. 
The City admits that the following two findings of the Appeal Board are erroneous 
and not supported by the record: 
1. On an unspecified date between January 19 and February 2, Rosen 
"was again instructed by Sgt. Cole to stay away from [Soper] and to 
leave her alone" and "was instructed to give the situation time to cool 
off R. 55. 
2. "On or about January 28, 2011, Chief Hicken met with officer Rosen 
regarding the pants incident and to close the IA investigation. During 
that meeting, he verbally counseled Officer Rosen and instructed him 
to limit his contact with [Soper] to "professional" contact only. R. 55. 
Although these erroneous findings describe two phantom orders that were never given, the 
City claims they are harmless to Rosen. That is not true. 
Rosen entered Soper's name into a radio contest for tickets after the two phantom 
orders were allegedly given. R. 3; 59: 322:8-14. This is relevant because in the Appeal 
Board's mind, Rosen was instructed three separate times (rather than the one time alleged by 
10 
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the City) to limit his contact with Soper prior to entering Soper's name in the contest. The 
purported number of orders Rosen violated could have directly impacted the Appeal Board's 
perception of the proportionality of Rosen's discipline. Also, if the Appeal Board believed 
Rosen violated three direct orders rather than one, it would have had more reason to find 
Rosen's actions were purposefully insubordinate rather than the result of a misunderstanding, 
as Rosen argued at the hearing. However, one can never know precisely what impact those 
erroneous findings had on the Appeal Board's decision, particularly in light of the Appeal 
Board's failure to make findings regarding proportionality. For this reason, the Appeal 
Board's ruling should be reversed or the matter should be remanded for a new hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Aaron Rosen respectfully requests that he be 
reinstated to his former position as corporal with the City of Saratoga Springs Police 
Department, together with applicable back pay and benefits from February 26,2011, the date 
of his demotion. In the alternative, Rosen requests that the Court reverse and remand the 
matter for a new hearing before impartial appeal board members. 
DATED this 2^L day of March 2012. 
KESLER & RUST 
Ryan B. paitedy 
Attorneys for Petitioner Aaron Rosen 
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